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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-----0000000-----

JONATHAN LITTLE and HANNAH
LITTLE,
PlaintiffsRespondents,
v.
UTAH STATE DIVISION OF
FAMILY SERVICES,
DefendantsAppellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 18113

-----0000000-----

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
-----0000000-----

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff-Respondeilts, JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE,
filed an action in the District Court of Salt Lake County, for
the wrongful death of their natural daughter, JENNIFER, as a
result of the negligence of the Defendant-Appellant, Utah State
Division of Family Services.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the District Court, sitting without a jury on August 12 and 13, 1981.

The District Court found

that the Division of Family Services had a duty to protect JENNIFER LITTLE from harm they knew or should have known was likely,
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that.the Division of Family Services breached such duty, and
that JENNIFER'S death was the direct and
Defendant's breach of said duty.

prox~mate

result of

The Court entered judgment

against the Defendant in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount
of $20,000.00, plus funeral expenses and costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to affirm the District Court's ruling
and its judgment entered in favor of JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Statement of Facts presented by the Appellant does
not fairly and accurately describe the evidence at trial, and
Respondents therefore submit their own Statement of Facts.
On March 16, 1977, a Warrant and Order of Temporary
Placement directed to JENNIFER LITTLE was issued by the Second
District Juvenile Court based upon a Petition filed by LOIS M.
RUDD of the Division of Family Services.

JENNIFER'S parents,

JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE, appeared at the Juvenile Court hearing on April 6, 19.77, without counsel and admitted the allegations of the Petition. The Utah State Division of Family Services
was granted custody and guardianship of JENNIFER LITTLE pursuant
to an Order of the Second District Juvenile Court.

The Juvenile

Court made the following findings:
Said child is dependent through no fault of the
parents in that:
(1) said minor has not developed
properly and manifests autistic behavior: (2)
said minor is in need of specialized assistance

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which the parents are emotionally unable to provide.
(Exhibit 1)
On April 25, 1977, JENNIFER was placed in the home of RUSSEL
and PEARL MEIK, therapeutic foster parents for handicapped children and children with special problems.

The MEIKS had insuffic-

ient special training for caring for children with autistic
behavior.

(R. 323, 61). Upon placement in the MEIK foster home,

JENNIFER began periodically hitting her head against the floor
and walls, and pulled hair from her scalp causing herself constant
injury (R. 297).

Mrs. MEIK would keep JENNIFER nearby and hold

her during head-banging episodes. This conduct was reported by
Mrs. MEIK to CONNIE COWLEY, the Division of Family Services case
worker who had been assigned responsibility for JENNIFER'S case.
CONNIE COWLEY observed bruises on JENNIFER'S face (R. 235).
The foster care worker, however, did not instruct Mrs. MEIK to
take any further precaution (R. 225).

Mrs. LITTLE also expressed

her ·concerns about JENNIFER'S condition to CONNIE COWLEY (R.
235). JENNIFER LITTLE, two and one-half (2~) years old, died
on June 4, 1977, as a result of injuries to her head (R. 280).
At the time of her death, JENNIFER had bruises on her face and
body which were of various ages and in various stages of healing.
(R. 286).

On that day, JENNIFER had been left in the care of

another foster child living in the home, FLOYD HOOTEN, a mildly
retarded seventeen (17) year old boy (R. 217).

According to

the police reports which were admitted as evidence, FLOYD HOOTEN
may have hit JENNIFER several times on the head on the day she
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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died because she was fussing about going to the bathroom.
charges, however, were ever brought against him.

No

(Exhibits 27

& 28) .

In December, 1978, JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE, Respondents, filed suit against the Utah Division of Family Services,
alleging a course of negligent conduct upon the part of the Appellant which culminated in the death of their daughter.

The

Appellant's Motion to Dismiss (April 5, 1979), based in part
on

th~

Governmental Immunity Act, was denied as to the

Divi~ion

of Family Services, the District Court finding that the discretionary function exception did not apply.

(R. 62-64). After a

two day trial, the District Court found that the Division of
Family Services had a duty to protect JENNIFER, that the duty
was breached, and that her death was proximately caused thereby.
Judgment was entered for Plaintiffs and damages awarded in the
amount of $20,000.00, plus funeral expenses and costs.

(R.

457-463, 158-162).
POINT ONE
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
THE APPELLANT DIVISION OF FAMILY
SERVICE'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED
ON THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT.
Appellant, Division of Family Services, seeks absolute
immunity for negligent actions performed by its employees and
agents in the foster care program.

Such a narrow interpretation

of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1 et _seq.,
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is neither necessary or desirable.

This Court has noted that

the legislature, in drafting the Act, intended ''to allow the
Court flexibility and adaptability in fashioning consistent and
rational limits to governmental immunity."
~ke

Staniford v. Salt

CitL_Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1980).

Such a recog-

nition is fully consistent with the need to balance the injury
suffered by the individual citizen against the effect which the
burden of recovery places upon the effective administration of
government.
1.

Weighing these considerations, Respondent contends:
The foster care program of the Division of Family

Services does not perform a governmental function within the
meaning of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
2.

Even if the foster care program is recognized as

a governmenal function, the discretionary function exception
to the general waiver of immunity for negligence does not apply
in this case.

A
THE MAINTENANCE OF A FOSTER CARE
PROGRAM IS NOT A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
states:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this Act,
all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally owned
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental
health care facility.
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In Staniford v. Salt Lake City Corp., ~upra, this Court held
that the test for determining whether a particular state or municipal activity was a governmental

function, depended upon if

it was "of such a unique nature that it can only be performed
by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core
of governmental activity."

605 P.2d at 1237.

out that while the new standard

The Court pointed

broadened governmental liability,

the Governmental Immunity Act did authorize the procuring of
governmental insurance protection, the cost of which could be
included within the budget of governmental entities, Id at 1237.
In Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah
1981), the Plaintiff brought suit against a city when her daughter's sled collided with an upright timber implanted in concrete
on a golf course used for $ledding during the winter.

The Dis-

trict Court dismissed the case on the basis of governmental immunity.

This Court, in reversing that dismissal, reaffirmed

the validity of the "uniqueness test" for determining that scope
of governmental function.

The Court further clarified the para-

meters of the test by noting:
The first part of the Standiford test - activity
of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency - does not refer
to what ~overnmPnt may do, but to what government
alone must do, 629 P.2d at 434 (emphasis added).
In both Standiford and Johnson, the Court held that recreational
activities maintained by a municipality were not of such a unique
nature that they could only be conducted by a governmental ag-
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ency.
Whether the maintenance of a city sewer system was
essential to the core of governmental activity was at issue in
Thomas v. Clearfield City, No. 17338, filed February 24, 1982
(Utah 1982).

In this case, a blockage in the sewer line caused

sewer water to collect in the Plaintiff's basement.

The District

Court granted the city's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis
of governmental immunity.

In reversing the ruling of the District

Court, the Court noted that even though the legislature had provided municipalities with the option to enforce mandatory hookups
into city sewer systems, "it does not follow from this that the
function automatically qualifies for governmental immunity as
'essential to the core of governmental activity.'"

The Court

noted, "(i)t is not even mandatory that a governmental entity
perform these functions."

No. 17338 at 3,4.

Utah's Governmental Immunity Act is similar to that
of the State of Michigan.
608 P.2d at 1236.

Staniford v. Salt Lake City Corp.,

In Robison v. City of Sterling Heights, 290

N.W.2d 43 (Mich. App. 1979), the Plaintiff was injured while
working on a water main construction project for the Defendant
municipality and brought action for damages.

The trial Court

granted Summary Judgment for the Defendant on the ground of governrnental immunity.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial

Court:
We conclude that . . . the operation of a municipal water system is not a governmental func-
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tion.
Since the government is not the only entity involved in supplying the public with drinking water, it is not an operation that can be
effectively accomplished only by the government.
290 N.W. 2d at 45
The Court further went on to note that allowing tort
liability would not result in an impermissible interference with
effective government.

Potential liability should simply be taken

into consideration as a cost of performing the particular service.

I

I

I

I

290 N.W. 2d at 45.
The Michigan Court of Appeals refined the governmental
function test in Churchwell v. Board of Regents of the University
of Michigan.

296 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. App. 1980).

In this case

the Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging she sustained injuries
through negligent treatment of the University of Michigan Hospital, and the trial Court dismissed on the basis of governmental
immunity.

The Michigan Supreme Court in Parker v. Highland Park,

404 Mich. 183, 272, N.W.2d 413 (1978), had held that the d~ily
operation of a hospital does not constitute a governmental function.

The Defendant sought to distinguish Parker by arguing

that the University of Michigan Hospital was a teaching hospital
affiliated with a legislatively mandated medical school, and
had no counterpart in the private sector.

296 N.W.2d at 78.

The Court of Appeals did not agree:
We do not find that the purpose, planning and
earring out of the day to day operation of the
University Hospital can be effectively accomplish· · · · · ·
ed only by the Government. We recognize that,

-8-
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I

from an economic standpoint, perhaps the operation
of a medical school can only be so effectuated.
This, in itself, is controvertible, however, when
one considers that private institutions for the
training of other health care professionals,
such as dentists and nurses, do exist in the
state.
In any event, in applying the definition
of governmental function, we must focus upon the
precise operation sought to be held immune rather
than overall or principal de~rtmental operation.
296 N.W.2d at 78 (emphasis added).
The test for determining whether a particular governmental activity falls within the governmental function category
hinges upon whether the activity is of such a value that it must
be performed by the government.

The criteria used to determine

if the function must be performed by the government relates to
whether the service being performed has any equivalent in the
private sector and whether it is

mand~tory

that the government

perform the service. In the case before the Court, these criteria
are not established. It is not mandatory that the State perform
all foster care and other agencies also provide such care. There
are at least three private agencies in Utah that maintain established foster care programs:

Childrens Service Society of Utah,

LDS Social Services, and the Catholic Community Service. Section
78-3a-39(11) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) specifically empowers the
Juvenile Court to release children to the care of an individual or to a private agency or institution.
This Court should focus its analysis upon the precise
governmental activity sought to be held immune rather than the
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overall departmental operation.

Respondent does not argue that

every activity of the Division of Family Services does not fall
within the category of a governmental function.

The operation

of the foster care program by the Division of Family Services
is not "so essential to the core of governmental activity" that
it "must" be performed by the state government. The foster care
program is not a uniquely governmental activity, and has counterparts in the private sector.

It does not meet the criteria needed

to establish it as a governmental function within the meaning
of Utah Code Annotated, 63-30-3.

Mere legislative recognition

does not automatically qualify the activity for governmental
immunity, Thomas v. Clearfield Citl, supra, at 3.
B

EVEN IF THE FOSTER CARE PROGRAM
IS RECOGNIZED AS A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION, THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL WAIVER OF
IMMUNITY FOR NEGLIGENCE DOES NOT
APPLY IN THIS CASE.
The immunity from suit for the negligent performance
of a governmental function is not absolute.

The grant of immun-

ity is limited by Section 63-3-10(1) of the Utah Code Annotated
which states:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of his employment except if the
injury:
(1) arises out of the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercize or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion
is abused.
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In deciding whether any particular governmental function is discretionary and hence immune to suit, this Court has
adopted the planning-operational test, Carroll v. State Road
Commission, 27 Qtah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972).

In applying

this test, the Court, "has followed the lead of cases interpreting the Federal Tort Claim Act.''

Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517,

519 (Utah 1980).
The United States Supreme Court first analyzed the
discretionary function exception in Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953).

The case arose from a fire and explosion

in Texas which killed more than 500 persons.

With two members

of the Court not participating, and over the strong dissent of
Justice Jackson, a four member majority concluded that discretion
"includes determination made by executives or administration
in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operation.
Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is
discretion."

346 U.S. at 35-36.

The broad definition of discretion pronounced by the
Court in Dalehite was narrowed somewhat two years later in Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). Plaintiff sought
to hold the government liable for the negligent failure to maintain a lighthouse with the result that a ship and barge went
aground and were damaged. In reversing the lower Court's dismissal
on the basis of governmental immunty, the Supreme Court held
that the original policy decision to implement the operation
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of the lighthouse was discretionary.

Once parties began to act

in reliance on the lighthouse, _however, the government was obligated to use due care in the maintenance of the light or to give
warning that it was not functioning.

350 U.S. at 69.

In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1972), the Plaintiffs
claimed that the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents invaded their privacy by publishing certain derrogatory
documents for use by congress and others.

The Court held that

while the Defendants were acting within the scope of their duties,
the performance of these duties was not a discretionary function.
The Court reasoned that mere affiliation with legislative action
did not confer immunity.

412 U.S. at 323-24.

To determine what

areas of governmental conduct should be considered discretionary,
the Court advised "a discerning inquiry into whether the contribution of immunity to effective government in_particular context
outweighs the perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens."
412 U.S. at 320.
The Supreme Court clearly considers the initial decision making and implementation of high level policy judgment to
be a protected discr~tionary function.

A charge in the course

of the Missouri River, Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816
(8th Cir. 1950), or a decision to conduct tests of nuclear explosions, Bartholomae v. United States, 135 F.Supp. 651 (S.D.
Calif. 1955), are examples of such policy judgments which have
been granted immunity.

The distinction between the planning
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and preparation of governmental programs and the subsequent operation of those programs has been concisely summarized by the
Ninth Circuit in United Airlines, Inc., v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379
(9th Cir. 1964), cert denied 375 U.S. 951, 85 S.Ct. 452, 13
L.Ed.2d 549:
discretionary to undertake firefighting, lighthouse, rescue, or wrecked ship marking services,
but not discretionary to conduct such operations
negligently; discretionary to admit a patient
to an army hospital, but not discretionary to
treat the patient in a negligent manner; discretionary to establish a post office at a particular location, but not to negligently fail to
install handrails; discretionary to establish
control towers at airport and to undertake air
traffic separation, but not to conduct the same
negligently . . .
335 F.2d at 393, footnote omitted.
Also see
Prosser on Torts.
4th Ed., pp. 972 - 74.
The Federal Courts have applied the planning - operational test to a variety of factual circumstances in an attempt
to determine what constitutes a discretionary function.

In Grif-

fin v. United States, 505 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974), the Plaintiff
became a quadrapalegic as a result of ingesting live virus polio
vaccine which -

though it had been subjected to testing for safe-

ty - had been approved for release to the public in a manner
inconsistent with H.E.W. regulations.

The Court of Appeals up-

held the District Court's finding that there was no discretionary
function involved and stated:
The fact that judgment of government officials
occur in areas requiring professional expert evaluation does not necessarily remove those judgments
from the examination of courts by classifying

-13-
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them as discretionary acts . . . This Court is
fully capable of scrutinizing the processes and
conclusions of the decision-makers by the usual
standards applied to cases of professional negligence.
500 F.2d at 1066-67, citations omitted.
In Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975),
a passenger plane being hijacked to the Bahamas, stopped to refuel
in Jacksonville, Florida.

The FBI initiated a gunbattle with

the hijacker which provoked the hijacker to shoot a woman, the
pilot and himself.

A survivor brought suit and the District

Court found for the Plaintiffs, holding that the "discretionary
function" exception was not applicable.

The Court of Appeals,

in upholding the ruling of the District Court, rejected the argument that the exercise of "judgment" during the performance of
a governmental activity was the crucial factor "which immunizes
the United States from the liability for the torts of its empoyees."

522 F.2d at 995.

The Court instead focused its inquiry

upon whether the conduct of the FBI agents was involved in the
making of policy.

The Court noted that FBI hijacking policy

had been formulated before the hijacking and it did not consider
the actions of the chief agent in directing the handling of the
situation as ad hoc formulation of government policy. 522 F.2d
at 997.
Case workers for the foster care program exercise their
duties with reference to a pre-existing set of policy guidelines:
the guidelines for Substitute Care (Children) contained in the
"Direct Services Section" of the Family Services Manual (April,
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1980).

These guidelines are far from nebulous.

For example,

Section VSCF 310 Pre-Placement and Placement Activities, states:
"When the placement appears to be in the best interest of the
child, the workers perform the following.activities."

After

this statement there are listed twenty (20) activities the case
workers should perform, including . . .
6.

Determine and select with parents, as far
as possible, the kind of substitute care place·
ment to best suit the child's needs, using
the guidelines for placement . . .

14.

Make an application for a medical card on
Court adjudicated children . . .

17.

Shares information with the foster arents
to ena e t em to provi e appropriate care,
to understand and be able to deal with the
child's behavior, and meet the child's needs.
(emphasis added).

The decision for placement of a child in "special foster care", as was the case with JENNIFER LITTLE, does not rest
with the judgment and discretion of the case worker.

When a

case worker makes a recommendation for special foster care, Sec~

tion VSCF 320 Screening for Special Care ( 1), informs us:

''The

district staff reviews the request and approves or denies the
placement."
The treatment accorded a foster child is also not
based solely on the discretion and judgment of the case worker.
Section VSCF401 Treatment Plan, states:
1.

Within 30 days of receiving a case, the worker, with the family, will make a treatment
plan to be shared with the Court . .

-15-
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2.

The treatment plan should specifically state
what parents are to do, what the child is
to do~ and what the worker is to do to resolve the problem. The plan shall state the
tiffie limit for accomplishing this objection
of the plan, resources to be used, and shall
indicate the proposed behavioral outcome of
the services.
(emphasis added).

3.

The plan is to be the basis of all services
to the child and family . . .

The implementation of a treatment plan is provided for in Section VSCF 402 Supervision, which states:
1.

During the time that the child is in foster
care, the worker will carry out the provision
of the treatment plan.

2.

The worker helps the foster parent, child
and natural parents resolve the problems which
arise during care . . .

3.

The worker maintains ongoing contact with
the foster parents at a minimum of once a
month.

4.

The worker reviews progress toward goals of
the treatment plan, and reviews the plan as
needed.

Case workers for the foster care program perform their duties
with reference to a published and clearly articulated set of
guidelines, and thus do not engage in formulating departmental
policy goals.
This issue of the discretionary nature of a professional's supervision of human beings in accordance with government
promulgated guidelines is ~drnittedly a difficult one.

The var-

ious dimensions of this problem, however, were carefully explored by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in PaY.!_on v. United

-16-
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States, 636 f.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981).

The Plaintiffs, the husband

and children of a murder victim, alleged that a federal prisoner
had been released from custody in disregard of medical reports
confirming him as a homocidal psychotic, and that shortly thereafter, he brutally murdered the victim.

The Court of Appeals,

in reversing the District Court's dismissal, called for a balancing test is assessing the nature and quality of the discretion
involved in the planning-operational distinction. Applying this
test to the facts before it, the Court concluded:
The question then becomes, where does the discretion of the Parole Board lie? It is important
to note at this point that the a11egatrons attack
only the application of the Parole Boards guidelines to Whisenhant, and not the guidelines themselves. The exercise of polic! making discretion
by-the Board occurred in f ormu ating and imRlementing the guidelines criteria . . . Such poTTcy" decisions, whether good or bad, are probably
exempt under Dalehite. But surely the application of their guiaeTI'nes to Whisenhart is not.
~uch an act has none of the political policy overtones that exist in certain law enforcement situations, such as enforcing integration . . .
The choices involved in applying the guidelines
and releasing a particular person are of another
sort. Whether characterized as "operational",
"day-to-day" or some other label, they do not
achieve the status of a basic policy evaluation
and decision.
636 F.2d at 146-47, citations omitted (emphasis
added) .
The Court also noted that Plaintiff's loss could be described
as severe and isolated, and that such a loss was difficult to
justify as the risk of almost any governmental activity.
F. 2d at 1145.
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636

A similar balancing test was used by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in an attempt to delineate the mode of discretion exercised at the operational level from true policy formulation.

In Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977), the

Plaintiff brought action for medical malpractice against an Air
Force physician alleging that the Defendant had negligently treated her for conditions relating to her pregnancy. The Court of
Appeals, in reversing the District Court's dismissal, followed
the lead of the Supreme Court in Doe v. McMillan, supra, and
directed its analysis first to deciding if Defendant's actions
were discretionary, and then to balancing the redress of the
harm suffered by the individual against the burden this places
on effective government.

557 F.2d at 737.

The Court adduced

the following test to distinguish discretionary from operational
functions:

''Gener~lly

speaking, a duty is discretionary if it

involves judgment, planning or policy decisions.

It is not dis-

cretionary if it involves enforcement or administration of a
mandatory duty at the operational level, even if professional
expert evaluation is required.''

557 F.2d at 737-38.

The Court

was careful to distinguish the type of discretion exercised by
a professional during the course of his or her official employment, and the type of departmental policy formulation which is
granted immunity:
Plaintiff's Complaint merely charges Defendant
with the negligent practice of medicine: it does
not ask the District Court to review a federal
health policy. We recognize that medical treat-
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ment by a government doctor involves jud~ment
and discretion. This does not resolve t e matter,
however, because rneoTcal treatment by a government doctor does not necessarily involve governmental discretion.
557 F.2d at 738 (emphasis added).
The Court next focused

o~

the competing interest be-

tween the citizen's recovery for harm and the burden of their
recovery upon the government.

The policy consideration which

the Court felt weighed heaviest in favor of recovery was the
gravity of harm to the individual citizen.

Where this is suf-

ficiently grave, it should preclude immunity.

In evaluating

the detrimental effect which the disallowing of immunity would
have upon governmental action, the Court observed:
Effective government would not suffer excessively if monetary compensation were permitted because the alleged wrongful conduct does not involve politically sensitive judgment or discretionary governmental acts.
Granting damages to Plaintiff would not tend to constrict governmental
functioning in an area where prompt governmental
action and snap governmental judgments are necessary.
557 F.2d at 739.
As the Court noted in Payton, the loss of a loved one is a severe
and isolating injury,. and under the balancing test as developed

by the federal courts, such a harm as suffered by JONATHAN and
HANNAH LITTLE should preclude immunity.

The Respondents are

not asking the Court to review state foster care policy. What
the LITTLES do assert is that the acts and omissions which brought
about JENNIFER'S death resulted from the negligent application
of the foster care policy guidelines, and that as such, these
choices can only be characterized as operational.
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The California Courts have so held.

In Elton v. Coun~

of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1083, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970) a Court
reversed a dismissal of a Complaint and ruled that a cause of
action was stated by a child against a county, the Department
of Social Welfare, and the Probation Department of negligence
in placing the child in a home where she was beaten and that
certain regulations had not been complied with, resulting in
injury to the child.

The Court noted:

Decision for the maintenance, care, and supervisiions of a dependent child, or in connection
with the child's placement in a particular -home,
may entail the exercise of discretion in a liberal sense, but such determinations do not achieve
the level of basic policy decision and thus do
not, under Government Code Section 820.2 preclude
judicial inquiry into whether negligence of public employees was involved . .
It was noted above that the planning-operational test,
as it evolved in the federal courts, was adopted by Utah in Carroll

v~

(1972).

State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888
Plaintiffs had alleged that they accidently drove on

to an abandoned highway and suffered injury as a result of the
negligence of the road commission in using earthen beams to block
the abandoned road.

The trial Court held that the discretionary

exception to the Governmental Immunity Act was not applicable.
This Court, in upholding that ruling, decided that the road super·
visor's decision to use beams to block the road "was not a basic
policy decision essential to the realization or accomplishment
of some basi~ governmental policy, program or objective .

. .

His determination may properly be characterized as one at the
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operational level of decision making .

.

"

496 P.2d at 891-92.

The planning-operational test was applied again in
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), when the Plaintiffs
brought suit for property damage resulting from
struction of a highway project.

n~gligent

con-

The Court, in upholding the

liability of the state, noted that while the decision to build
the highway and specifying its general location were discretionary functions, the preparing of plans and specifications and
the supervision of the manner in which the work was carried out
could not be labeled discretionary.

541 P.2d at 1120.

This Court, however, in Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242
(Utah 1976), chose not to apply the planning-operational test.
The Plaintiffs were the children of a murder victim and brought
suit against the state alleging it was negligent for allowing
a prisoner on its work-release progrm to
opinion,

rest~d

escape~

The majority

upon both the discretionary function exception

and the exception in Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10(10)
which retains immunity if the injury "arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail
or other place of legal confinement. .

"

In summarily deny-

ing relief to the Plaintiffs the Court did not discuss Carroll
or Andrus.

Justice Maughan, however, in a forceful dissert,

made the following observation:
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Whether we have work release programs, or not,
is a basic policy decision, and discretionary
with the state, insofar as they are constitutionally permissible. No question is raised against
that proposition. But, it does not follow that
the escape of the prisoner from the work release
program is also discretionary with the State.
When we commend the work release program we commend a discretionary act taken at the planning
level, the basic policy making level. Here we·
are not concerned with decisions made on that
level, we are concerned with circumstances occurring and decisions made on the operational leyel.
This Court has clearly made that distinction in
Carroll v. State Road Commission.
546 P.26 at 245.
Faced with a similar fact situation, the Nevada Supreme
Court applied the planning-operational test in State v. Silvia,
478 P.2d 591 (Nev. 1970).

The Plaintiffs, husband and wife,

brought suit to recover damages resulting from the rape of the
wife by an escaped inmate of a state run honor camp.

In uphold-

ing the trial verdict for Plaintiffs, the Court observed:

"Al-

though the selection of irimates for honor camp service may primarily be a discretionary act, the manner in which the camp is
supervised and controlled is mainly operational in nature."
478 P.2d at 593.
In a series of recent cases, Utah has again relied
upon the planning-operational test.

When the State Tax Comn1ission

sold the Plaintiff's motorcycle without notifying him, after
the motorcycle was impounded and being held as evidence against
the person charged with its theft, this Court in Morrison v.
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Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 1979), held that the
decision to sell the motorcycle did not involve an exercise of
basic policy evaluation, but was rather operational, 600 P.2d
at 555. In Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), the
Plaintiffs,

injur~d

in an automobile accident, brought suit ag-

ainst the state claiming that the state had negligently designed
the traffic control light at the intersection.

This Court, apply-

ing the planning-operational test, reversed the trial Court's
ruling that the state was immune.

The Court concluded:

Although the act of the State involved in designing the traffic control system involves some degree
of discretion as to almost all acts, the design
of the traffic control system does not involve
the basic "policy making level".
618 P.2d at 53.
As can be observed from the preceding cases, where
the issue of a discretionary function arises out of a technical
program rather than a program concerning the case and safety
of human beings, the line drawing between the planning and operational levels is less complicated.

The Utah Code, however,

specifically withdraws certain non-technical governmental programs
from judicial scrutiny in this regard.

The government is exempt

from liability for any injury arising out of the incarceration
of any person in a penal custodial program, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 63-30-10(10).

The planning-operational test has little

impact on this area of governmental activity.
An effective application of the planning-operational
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test to a non-technical program, however, was clearly demonstrated
by this Court in Frank v. State, 63 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).

The

Plaintiff in this case brought suit against the state for negligence in the death of his son, Jack Alger.

Alger had been under-

going treatment at the University of Utah Medical Center, and,
notwithstanding the fact that Alger informed those responsible
for his care that he had previously attempted to take his own
life, no action was taken to restrain or treat Alger; on the
I

\

contrary, he was permitted to leave the hospital.
he committed suicide.

Soon after,

The Plaintiff's suit was dismissed by

the trial Court on the basis of governmental immunity.

This

Court reversed and drew the distinction between the exercise
of operational level discretion necessary in any non-technical
program, and planning level discretion which applies when organizational or program-wide goals are formulated and implemented,
concluding:
The Court recognizes the high degree of careful
observation, evaluation, and educated judgment
reflected in any modern medical prognosis, and
makes no suggestion that a large measure of "discretion", as commonly defined, is not involved.
The exception to the statutory waiver h~re under
consideration, however, was intended to shield
those governmental acts and decision impacting
on large numbers of ~ople in a myriad of unforeseeable ways from inaTvidual and class legaT actions, the continual 'fllreat Of whiCFlwould make
public admini~tration all but impossible. The
one-to-one dealings of phySTCian and patient in
no way reflect their public policy making posture,
and should not be given shelter under the Act.
613 P.2d at 520 (emphasis added).
As was the case in Frank, no action was taken by those
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charged with the duty to care for JENNIFER LITTLE, to adequately
protect her when they knew or should have known that harm was
likely or to train the foster parents or to provide them with
the necessary, proper equipment to handle JENNIFER'S problems.
In line with the holding of Frank, Respondents contend that the
negligent acts and omissions which resulted in JENNIFER'S death
can in no sense be considered "governmental acts and decision
impacting on large_ numbers of people", or as reflecting a "public
policy-making posture".

The acts and omissions resulted from

the performance of policy guidelines and not their formulation,
and as such are activities conducted at the operational level.
The Respondents have suffered an egregious and isolating harm.

Such a loss as this cannot be justified as incidental

to the functioning of the foster care program.

The foster care

program is not fraught with political or policy overtones and
the imposition of liability in this case will not be overly burdensome upon the program.

The Governmental Immunity Act auth-

orizes the procurement of insurance protection.

The Respondents

do not seek to have the Court pass judgment upon the policies
of the foster care program.

They merely seek just compensation

for their loss.
POINT TWO
TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE DIVISION OF FAMILY
SERVICES HAD A DUTY TO PROTECT AND
CARE FOR JENNIFER LITTLE AND THAT
THE DUTY WAS BREACHED.
On April 6; 1977, the Utah State Division of Family
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Services was granted custody and guardianship of

JENNIFE~

LITTLE

pursuant to an Order of the Second District Juvenile Court.
Section 78-3a-39(3) U.C.A., gives the Juvenile Court the power
to:
(v)est Legal custody of the child in the (State
Division of Family Services/State Department of
Social Services) or the public agency, department, or institution, or in a child placement
agency as defined herein, for placement in a foster
home or other facility . . .
Section 78-3a-2(7) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended) defines
"legal custody" as:
a relationship embodying the following rights
and duties: A right to physical custody of a child;
the ri~ht and duty_to protect, train, and discipline im; the duty_to provide him with food,
clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical
care; the right to determine whe~e and with whom
Ke--sfiall live, and the right, in an em~rgency,
to authorize emergency or other extraordinary
care.
(emphasis added).
This Court stated in Wilson v. Family Services Division
Region Two, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976), that once there has been
an adjudication depriving the natural parents of the custody
of their child and the child is placed in the custody of Family
Services, "the latter then has the responsibility and authority
to safeguard the welfare of the child, including the placement
in a home for that purpose.

. ."

554 P.2d at 229 (emphasis ad-

ded).
The important policy consideration underlying the "responsibility and authority to safeguard the welfare of the child"
was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in In Re Tanner, 549
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P.2d 703 (Utah 1976).

In this case a child under the guardian-

ship of Family Services, sought judicial enforcement of his right
to dental care.

The Court, in upholding the child's right to

care, noted that there is a "concept inherent in our law respecting children; that in a civilized society, all children, even
those without parents, or a home, should be provided not only
food, clothing and shelter, but other basic needs, incuding necessary medical and dental care."

549 P.2d at 705.

The difficulties of JENNIFER'S head banging, and the
fact that she was pulling her own hair out to the extent that
she had a bald spot near the crown of her head, were communicated to the supervising care worker.

The caseworker herself ob-

served JENNIFER on May 17, 1977 (R. 235, 459).

Because of JENNI-

FER'S special problems, which were known by the Division of Family
Services prior to and during _placement, the statutory and judicially recognized duties were augmented.

This is particularly

true where JENNIFER was removed from her parents through no fault
of theirs in order to provide her with "specialized assistance."
To argue that the State owes a limited duty under these circumstances simply defies logic.
The rule stated

~y

this Court in Wheeler v. Jones,

19 Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 985 (1967), relating to the scope of
duty where the safety of children is concerned, must certainly
be amplified where the child is under a known disability.

The

Court stated:
Negligence is the breach of the duty to use due
care under the circumstances of the situation.
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when children are involved, the duty to look out
for their safety is increased, and failure to
make a given discovery might be _negligence when
children are involved and not negligence if adults
only are affected.
431 P.2d at 988.
JENNIFER LITTLE was known to have autistic tendencies.
The Division of Family Services was under a legal duty to place
her in a home able to safeguard her welfare.

This was not done.

Mrs. MEIK, the foster mother, was never informed of the specifics
of JENNIFER'S behavioral problem.

When she informed the supervis-

ing case worker, CONNIE COWLEY, of ·the difficulty she was encountering, she was simply told that JENNIFER should be evaluated.
(R. 209-210).

The evaluation eventually took place, but the

results of the evaluation were never explained to Mrs. Meik.
(R. 211).

Furthermore, even though Mrs. MEIK had received some

training to become a therapeutic foster parent, her ability to
deal with JENNIFER'S head-banging was limited because she had
never before had a child with problems like JENNIFERS in her
home ( R. 207) .
The seriousness of JENNIFER'S head-banging cannot be
overemphasized.

Mrs. MEIK stated that for most of the time JEN-

NIFER was in her home she had bruises on her forehead, on her
cheekbones, and below her eyes.

(R. 213).

When asked why she

kept JENNIFER'S potty chair in the hallway, Mrs. MEIK answered:
"Because I was afraid· she would throw herself forward off that
potty chair and hit her face on the tub or the wash basin or
the toilet in the bathroom".

(R. 214).

The head-banging commenc·
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ed only after JENNIFER'S placement with DFS. (R. 178).
The duty of the Division of Family Services in this
instance extended beyond merely placing JENNIFER in a therapeutic foster home.

The duty clearly extended to placing her with

therapeutic foster parents who were adequately trained to deal
with children with autistic tendencies and head-banging problems,
and at the least to provide the foster parents with meaningful
advice and whatever equipment they might need to prevent harm.
In Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503, P.2d 139
(1972) the Plaintiff brought an action for damages to his home
by irrigation water which flooded there after use by the Defendant.

The Court stated:
It is to be conceded to the Plaintiff that the
degree of care increases in proportion to the
hazard to be anticipated; and because of the dangers inherent in the management of flowing water,
the concept of ordinary care and prudence under
the particular circumstances requires that its
management not be left to novices, but should
any be entrusted to persons of some experience
and skill in the management of such water, who
would have an awareness of the various hazards
in the failure to properly control them and would
therefore exercise the degree of foresight and
precaution which people of such experience and
skill would observe to avoid injury or damage
to others .
·
503 P.2d at 140-41.

1

The principal articulated by the Court in this case
with respect to the degree of care that must be exercised in
managing a known hazardous condition, applies with equal if not
greater force, where the risk of harm is to a two and one half
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year old girl.

JENNIFER was not placed in a foster home where

the parents were trained specifically to deal with autistic children or to deal with children who were head-bangers.

Nor was

JENNIFER placed in a therapeutic foster home where the parents
were subsequently provided with training to deal with these problems.

(R. 211).

Behavior modification techniques were not taught

to the MEIKS as a means of altering JENNIFER'S behavior (R. 216),
and no medication for JENNIFER was ever offered (R. 211). The
foster parents were also not provided with any special equipment to deal with JENNIFER'S head banging.

Dr. Sargeant testi-

fied at trial that a helmet, along with behavioral modification
techniques or tranquilizers would have been an effective means
of dealing with

J~NNIFER'S

head-banging.

(R. 318-319).

Foresight and ingenuity in dealing with a known risk
may be necessary.

In Boeing Company v. State, 89 Wash. 2d 443,

572, P.2d 8 (1978), the owner of some jet engine brought an action against the state for damages sustained to the engine when,
being carried by truck, they struck the underside of an underpass.
The verdict at trial was for the Plaintiff.

In affirming this

verdict, the Supreme Court of Washington carefully analyzed the
requirements of reasonable care in light of known risks.
The Appellant contends that because such a system
(photoelectric cell device) was not in common
use . . . before the accident, to require the
city to exercise ingenuity in conceiving such
a system is to impose a duty of extraordinary
care upon it . . . However, there are extraordinary situations which may call for extraordinary
measures in the exercise of reasonable care __
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Here, the Respondent's evidence showed a past
history of frequent accidents in spite of the
warning sign posted.
It further showed.the Appellant's awareness of the need for a more effective warning system and that in other similar circumstances, governmental bodies had devised warning
system to meet the problem. This evidence was
sufficient to take to the jury the question whether
the .Appellant exercised reasonable care under
the circumstances. The jury would reasonably
conclude that the situation called for some ingenuity in the solution of the problem presented.
•

•

•

572 P.2 at 11-12, citation omitted.
JENNIFER'S problem, in a very real sense, called for extra
ful measures in the exercise of. due care.

care-

JENNIFER had been

diagnosed as having autistic tendencies and the Division of Family Services was made aware of JENNIFER'S head-banging and thus,
of the need for a more effective treatment program.

There were

treatment options available to the Division of Family Services.
The Court, sitting as the trier of fact, could reasonably conelude, given the scope of the duty involved, "that the situation called for some ingenuity in the solution of the problem
presented."
The scope of the duty a state agency owes to dependent foster children was considered by the Louisiana Supreme
Court. In Vonner v. State 273 So. 2d 253 (La. 1973), the Welfare
Department had acted in derogation of its own policies requiring
periodic visits and medical examination of foster

childr~n,

as

well as ignoring complaints by the mother and child that the
child was being treated cruelly.

The court noted that the alleg-

ed beatings extended over a period of time and could or should
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have been discovered by "conscientious performance of regular
visitation and annual medical examination prescribed by the Department's own regulation."

The Court concluded:

When the department obtains or accepts the cus: tody of children, it becomes directly responsible
for their care and well being.
It cannot insulate
itself from this responsibility by contracting
it out to others to fulfill.
For the reason to
be noted, the Department is vicariously liable
for the acts of the foster parents insofar as
they breached the duty of the Department (exercised
through them) for the child's well being . . .
It is the Department, not the foster parents,
who has the legal custody of the child and, consequently, "the right and responsibility to provide for the physical, mental, moral and emotional well being of the child."
(emphasis added).
A careful reading of Judge Rigtrup's holding discloses
no imposition of anything approaching absolute liability upon
the Division of Family Services.

The Judge stated:

The Court finds that the special problems of the
child were known, the risks to the child were
known or should have been known by the Division
of Family Services. The Court recognizes that
the MEIKS were qualified parents, were good parents, were conscientious parents, but they did
not receive very straightforward, simple information from the Division which was available and
at their disposal and which would have afforded
the child a good deal of protection . . .
The Court finds that the Division of Fa~ily Services violated its duty to protect the child,
given all the existing circumstances. (R. 461).
It was clearly the trial Court's role to determine
the scope of Division of Family Services' Duty in light of the
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state statute, case law, and the facts presented.
Colora~o

out by the
~rvices

v.

Kuli~,

As was pointed

Supreme Court in Metropolitan Gas Repair
621 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1980), "whether a Defendant

owes a legal duty to a particular Plaintiff is a question of
law

The Court determines as a matter of law, the existence

and scope of the duty - that is, whether the Plaintiffs' interest
that has been infringed by the conduct of the Defendant is entitled to legal protection."

621 P.2d at 317, citation omitted.

The Division of Family Services was aware of JENNIFER'S
behavioral disabilities, was aware of the risk of harm that was
created thereby, and was under a clear legal duty to act with
due care considering these circumstances.

The Division of Fam-

ily Services clearly breached their duty.
POINT THREE
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DIVISION
OF FAMILY SERVICES WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF JENNIFER LITTLE.
In Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 263 P.2d 287 (Utah
1953), the Plaintiff brought an action for the death of an automobile passenger who was killed when the automobile crashed into
the Defendant corporations truck which was parked partly in the
street.

The Court, in

~iscussing

the issue of proximate cause,

observed:
In addressing the question whether the parking
of the truck on the highway was an act of negligence, it should be remembered that an act is
not necessarily rendered non-negligent merely
because it may be said that no injury would result to another except for some subsequent act

-33-
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of negligence.
One is guilty of negligence where
he does such an act or omits to take such a precaution that under the circumstances present as
an ordinary prudent person, he ought reasonably
to foresee that he will thereby expose the interest of another to an unreasonable -risk of harm.
When one does so he may be held liable for resulting injuries caused by any reasonably foreseeable conduct, whether it be innocent, negligent
or even criminal.
263 P.3d at 290, footnotes omitted.
Thus, the Division of Family Services' failure to provide protective headgear for JENNIFER, or to adequately train
the Meiks to cope with JENNIFER'S head-banging is not rendered
non-negligent merely because JENNIFER might not have died except
for the concurring action of FLOYD HOOTEN, another foster child.
The Division of Family Services omitted to take the necessary
precaution, the lack of which they should have reasonably foreseen
would have resulted in grave risk to JENNIFER'S life.

Indeed,

Dr. Serge M. Moore, the medical examiner, testified:
There is evidence to the effect that there were
bruises on the scalp of various ages, and there
were some injuries in various stages prior to
the time of death.
In all probability, and most
likely with such probability as one can say in
medicine, these were part of an aggregate episode or episodes that eventually lead to the final
inJury or contributed to the death as a result
Oitlie final injury." (R. 286).
The parameters of what const.itutes "reasonably foresee.....

able" was

exami~ed

by the Court in Rees v. Albertson Inc., 587

P.2d 130 (Utah 1978).

In discussing the liability of a store

in selling beer to a minor, the Court stated:
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What is necessary to meet the tort of negligence
and proximate cause in that it be reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident would
occur, but only that there is a likelihood of
an occurrence of the same ~eneral nature. In that
connection, it is to be ha iri mind that the jury
is entitled to base its judgment, not only upon
the facts shown, but to indulge such reaonable
inferences as may be fairly drawn therefrom.
587 P.2d at 133.

(emphasis added).

Considering that JENNIFER had been diagnosed as having
autistic tendencies and was battering herself to the extent that
her face and forehead were constantly covered with bruises (R.
213), it was reasonably foreseeable that she would suffer some
severe head injury.

The Division of Family Services' breach

of its legal duty to protect JENNIFER was the proximate cause
of her death.

As the Court noted in Anderson v. Red-E-Mix Pav-

ing Company, 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970):

"We have indica·

ted our agreement with the well established rule that where one
is injured by the concurrent negligence of two wrongdoers, he
can recover from either or both, and this includes circumstances
where one has previously created a dangerous condition, which
combined with a later act of negligence . . . "

467 P.2d at 47.

In Utah, to constitute the proximate cause of an accident, the negligence that is committed must be a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm or result.
18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966).

Hall v. Blackham

The Arizona Supreme Court,

in McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P.2d 869 (1964), held
that a trial court erred in instructing a jury that "an act or
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omission cannot be a proximate cause if it contributes only
slightly or possibly to the result."

In evaluating the use of

the term "substantial factor" in tort actions, the Court concluded:

"It is not how little or how large a cause is that makes

it a legal cause, for a proximate cause is any cause which in
a natural and continuous sequence produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred."

448 P.2d at 871-72.

(emphasis in original).
Respondent asserts vigorously that absent the Division
of Family Services' breach of their legal duty, absent their
failure to provide JENNIFER LITTLE with protective headgear,
absent their failure to provide proper training and therapeutic
drugs, and responsible protection, JENNIFER would be alive today.
In a case such as this, the causal issue is dependent
upon the question of the scope of the duty involved.

Thode,

Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational
Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury,"
Review 1, 28.

1977 Utah Law

The interrelation of these two factors, often

glossed over by courts, was explicitly analyzed and used to serve
as the basis of liability in Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321,
534 P.2d 1360 (1975).

In this case Bitton was being pursued

upon a public highway by officers of the Seattle Police Department
and the Washington State Patrol.

One police officer attempted

to form a moving roadblock ahead of Bitton, who seeing the roadblock, attempted to accelerate past the officer.
over the median and collided with Mason's car.

Bitton crossed
The occupants
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of both cars were killed.

The Plaintiff brought action against

Bitton, the city, and the state.

The trial court held that as

a matter of law the conduct of the city and state was not a proximate cause of Mason's death, which, in fact resulted sotely
from the collision with Bitton's car.

The Supreme Court of Wash-

ington, sitting en bane reversed the holding of the trial judge.
The Court first took notice of a state statute covering the duty
owed by law enforement officials to the public in regard to the
operation of emergency vehicles.

The Court then noted:

Directly connected with the question of duty is
tFie issue of proximate cause. Having erroneously
limited the scope of the Defendant's duty, the
trial court concluded that the sole and proximate
cause of Mason's injuries was his collision with
the unlawfully driven vehicle, thereby exonerating
the Defendants from liability. The fact that
Bitton was obviously guilty of negligent conduct,
Wllich had a causal effect on the ultimate injuries
incurred by Mason, does not necessarily relieve
the Defendants of their potential liability, since
the law does not require that there be but one
proximate cause for any given event . . .
Washington, like an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, recognizes that if two individuals commit
independent acts of negligence which occur to
produce the proximate cause of an injury to a
third person, they are to be regarded as concurrent
tort feasors, and each is liable as if solely
responsib~e for the injury caused by the concurrent
acts of negligence.
534 P.2d at 1363-64 citation omitted (emphasis
added).
In the present case, it was not conclusively adduced
that the blows FLOYD HOOTEN struck were in any direct sense re- .
sponsible for JENNIFER'S death.

Evidence presented at trial
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indicated that JENNIFER did not show any evidence of skull fracture or any laceration.

(R. 272).

There was evidence of numer-

ous bruises on her face; sustained over a period of perhaps one
or two weeks (R. 274).

But even granting that JENNIFER'S

death

was the result of an aggregate trauma induced by her headbanging
and FLOYD HOOTEN'S blows, this would not relieve the Division
of Family Services of their liability.

It was clearly foreseeable

that JENNIFER might suffer a harm of the general nature which
in fact occurred.
In Cook v. Mortensen, 624 P.2d 675 (Utah 1981), a tenant, attempted to open some windows which had been negligently
painted shut by his landlord.

To accomplish this, the tenant

constructed a platform out of garbage cans and, while barefoot,
climbed atop this platform, fell, and sustained some injuries.
The Court, in wisely dismissing Plaintiff's claim, noted:

"One

who is aware of a potentially dangerous condition and fails to
take appropriate evasive action, or, as here, affirmatively acts
in a manner that actively aggravates the otherwise latent negligence of the Defendant, cannot later be heard to complain against
that negligence."

(624 P.2d at 670).

This admonition is more

applicable here to Appellant than Respondent.

It was not JENNIFER

LITTLE who was aware of a potentially dangerous condition and
failed to take appropriate evasive action, it was the Division
of Family Services.

It was not JENNIFER LITTLE that activated

the negligence of the Division of Family Services, it might only
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perhaps have been FLOYD HOOTEN.

The duty of the Division of

Family Services to JENNIFER LITTLE clearly encompassed an affirmative obligation to take into account JENNIFER'S behavioral
disabilities and to assure that she would not be cared for by
those - the MElKS, FLOYD

HOOT~N,

or training to properly do so.

or others - without the ability
The problem could have been dealt

with by placing her in a therapeutic foster home specifically
trained to deal with autistic children.

Family Services could

have trained the MEIKS to deal with JENNIFER'S head-banging,
with methods such as behavior modification.

The Division of

Family Services, aware of the severity of JENNIFER'S head-banging,
could have provided the MEIKS with protective head gear - one
of the standard protections against injury from head-banging.
(R. 321-322).

None of these acts were attempted by the Division

of Family Services.

These omissions were a clear breach of its

legal duty to protect JENNIFER and were the proximate cause of
her death.
DEAN LEON GREEN has provided some guidance in determining whether the duty incumbent upon a Defendant extends to
the harm suffered by the Plaintiff.

He states:

The determination of the issue of duty and whether it includes the particular risk imposed on
the victim ultimately rests upon broad policies
which underlie the law. There policies may be
characterized generally as morality, the economic good of the group, practical administration
of the law, justice as between the parties and
other consideration relative to the environment
out of which the case arose. They are found in
all decisions whether based on former decisions
of the Court or on a fresh consideration of the
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factors found in the current environment. It need
not be added that the scope or extent of duty
in any case can only be resolved by the learning,
experience, good sense and judgment of the judge
- the molding of law in response to the needs
of the environment.
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines 41 Texas
Law Review 42, 45 (1962).
POINT FOUR
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
PERMITTING DR. JANICE SARGENT
TO TESTIFY.
Rule 56(2) states:
If the witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness in the form of opinion or
inferences is limited to such opinions as the
judge finds are (a) based on facts or data perceived by or personally known or made known to
the witness at the hearing, and (b) within the
scope of the special kowledge, skill, experience
or training possessed by the witness.
Facts and data can be "made known to the witness at
the hearing" through the use of hypotheticals.

Wigmore, in dis-

cussing the use of hypotheticals at trial, observed:
The reasoning may be explained in the following
proposition:
(1) testimony in the shape of inference or conclusion rests always on certain premises of fact . . . (2) These premises, a consideration of which is essential to the formation of
the conclusion or cpinion, ~ust scmchow be supplied to the jury by testimony. The same witness
may supply both premises and conclusions; or one
witness may supply the premises and another the
conclusion . . .
2. Wigmore on Evidence, 792, Section 672.
phasIS in original).
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The testimony of DR. SARGEANT clearly falls within
these parameters.

The premises relating to autistic behavior

were supplied by the findings of the Juvenile Court, which stated
that JENNIFER "manifested autistic behavior" (R. 159-160).

Fur-

ther foundation was supplied by the testimony of LOIS RUDD, who
filed the original Juvenile Court Petition relating to JENNIFER
LITTLE~

In response to a question from Plaintiff's attorney as

to why she filed the dependency petition, Ms. RUDD answered:
"The child exhibited some autistic behavior.
its on the Petition.

the child was

I think she was about two years old.

She was not talking, she was not potty trained."

(R. 197).

Adequate foundation was also established for DR. SARGEANT' S testimony concerning problems arising with children who
begin head-banging at age two and one-half.

Evidence was pro-

duced establishing JENNIFER'S head-banging behavior in the foster
home (R. 297).

Evidence was also presented at trial that JENNI-

FER had never exhibited head-banging behavior in her own home
(R. 364).

That the expert witness, DR. SARGEANT, did not have

personal knowledge of these events is, as this Court noted in
Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah.1977), not relevant.
In that case, the Defendants were forced to sell their livestock
pursuant to an injunction issued by the city.

The Plaintiffs

objected to the testimony of an expert in livestock management
as to the losses Defendant has suffered, claiming the expert
witness had no actual knowledge regarding the Defendant's busi-
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ness.

The Court ruled:
In regard to Plaintiff's specific objection that
Mr. Evans did not have first-hand knowledge of
the Defendant's operation and therefore should
not have been permitted to testify, that objection
is without merit because the expert aoes not need
to have any such specific knowledge and he did
not pretend that -he did so. His testimony was
as to matters that would apply to any similar
situation.
571 P.2d at 1319 (emphasis added).
Further foundation for DR. SARGEANT'S testimony was

established when in response to a question from co-counsel for
the Defendant relating to knowledge of JENNIFER'S head-banging
which she had obtained independently of any discussion with counsel for the Plaintiff, DR. SARGEANT stated:
"Ye.s, yes, I do.
I read the deposition and there
were references to
"
(R. 327).
In Stickelvan v. Moroni, 632 P.2d 1159 (Nev. 1981), the Supreme
Court of Nevada held that it was not an abuse of discretion for
a trial judge to receive the expert witness testimony of an entomology professor who had reviewed depositions and summaries
of evidence.

The foundation for DR. SARGE'AJNT'S testimony had an
adequate basis in hypotheticals presented by counsel for the
Plaintiffs and in her reading of the deposition and was not based on what she was told by Plaintiff's counsel.

Where an "ade-

quate foundation" for an expert witnesses' testimony is established, the Court has not required that the expert testify as
an eyewitness.

Shurtleff v. Jay Taft and Company, 622 P.2d 1168,
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1173 (Utah 1980).
In Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P.2d 575
..
~

(1966), doubt was cast upon the sufficiency of expert testimony

~t

'

presented by a police officer concerning an automobile accident.
The Court stated:
It must be conceded that evidence which amounts
to mere guesswork should not be admitted . . .
Whether the officer has sufficient background
. . . is primarily for the trial court to determine.
If in his judgment the evidence will be
of [] assistance, frailties therein which may
be evident from his testimony or from cross-examination, go to the wei ht of his testimon , rather
I an its a missa 1 ity.
e etermination made
by the trial court should be given some credit
and should not be overturned unless it is made
clearly to appear that he was in error in his
judgment and that it resulted in substantial prejudice.

414 P.2d at 578 (emphasis added).
DR. SARGEANT'S testimony had adequate foundation in
the record and its admissibility did not result in any undue
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The Respondents, JONATHAN and HANNAH LITTLE, request
the Court to affirm the judgment of the District Court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

f~ay

of May, 1982.

Attorney for
spondents.
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Delivered, via TRS, two copies of the foregoing Brief
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